The 2020 Election is One Year Away. Here’s What You Need to Know About Election Security

This post was originally on the BPC blog co-authored by Timothy Harper

Americans learned after the 2016 election that our electoral process was not as secure as imagined. We may not know all the threats and tactics our adversaries will use during the 2020 cycle, but the country is miles ahead when it comes to repelling them.

Foreign adversaries in 2016 sought to sow distrust in democracy, exposing many weaknesses in our election system. Maybe the most glaring vulnerability in our system was an attribute of American elections that most thought to be a feature, not a bug: the decentralized nature of the voting process.

American elections are largely run by over 8,000 local administrators with varying levels of resources to defend against nation state actors. The local administrators and states in 2016 were left to defend themselves even when they were unaware in real-time about attempted cyberattacks happening across the country. This framework of defense is untenable. After all, we would never expect a solitary township in Michigan to defend itself against a military ground invasion from a foreign government, yet this is what local election offices were up against in the cyber realm.

Getting officials at the local, state, and federal level to work toward the same goal isn’t always easy, but it’s a real success story when it comes to U.S. elections after 2016. Officials in every state and territory, regardless of partisanship, have been working to protect and defend against cyber and other security threats to the 2020 presidential election. This time around, they have more resources than ever before. The Department of Homeland Security in 2017 designated elections as critical infrastructure. This designation led DHS to prioritize security assistance to state and local jurisdictions, enhance information sharing about security threats, and establish formal coordination mechanisms.

The critical infrastructure designation initially sparked bipartisan condemnation from states concerned about the expanding federal role in elections—a state prerogative. DHS responded by investing in building relationships and listening to election officials’ concerns and has now established itself as a key resource for state and local governments when it comes to providing resources, training, and monitoring. This monitoring will prove helpful in 2020.

For example, while foreign actors in 2016 were probing voter registration systems in all 50 states, information about these threats was not being shared effectively because there was no mechanism to do so. In fact, we learned from reporting that federal law enforcement officials were in contact with some state officials about attempted cyberattacks, but oftentimes they were not talking to the state personnel responsible for the voting process. DHS has since created the Election Infrastructure Information Sharing and Analysis Center, or EI-ISAC, to allow election jurisdictions to share information about threats in real-time. All 50 states and nearly 2,000 local election officers are members.

Despite these important improvements, it remains a long-term concern that the critical infrastructure designation could be rescinded at any time. Whereas other critical infrastructure designations are established in law, the elections designation was made at the secretary level. That’s why we believe Congress should codify the designation in statute. We worry that a different DHS secretary with other funding priorities could leave the elections community without a strong federal partner in election security considering how little funding the U.S. Election Assistance Commission receives.

Funding for election security to the states is another concern. States and locals need more funding—and more consistent funding—to secure elections. The $380 million in election security grants appropriated in 2018 were the first federal appropriation to states for election administration since 2010 and, while the money was useful, for some states it translated to just $3 million. Elections have swelled into complex logistical and IT operations in the last two decades and require consistent state and federal investment commensurate with their scale.

There is still time for any additional funding appropriated by state and federal legislators to be put to good use in advance of 2020. These include upgrading voter registration databases, implementing two-factor authentication and other firewalls, and investing in cybersecurity training programs and contingency planning exercises for local administrators. Some small election jurisdictions need assistance just getting to a basic level of cybersecurity preparation.

One risk that probably cannot be addressed before 2020 is the voting machines in the polling places. There are still some states using voting technology tested to standards created before the original iPhone was released. Some of these systems also lack a paper record and upgrading to modern systems that use robust and auditable paper ballots is an important priority. Due to long timelines for purchasing and implementation, it is unlikely any money appropriated in late 2019 or 2020 will lead to voters seeing new machines on Election Day.

Elections are more secure than ever. Resources and relationships matter. Election officials at the state and local level with the help of federal partners are working together on the most impactful solutions in the near-term while also planning for the long-term. With a year to go, policymakers should do everything they can to help election officials build on their successes to create the 21st century election process about which all Americans can be proud.

Now Is the Time to Fully Fund Election Assistance Commission

This post was originally posted to the BPC blog.

Elections are receiving more attention than ever. Record turnout during the 2018 midterms leads me to believe that the 2020 presidential cycle will see a huge increase in turnout over recent years. But that public interest in elections hasn’t carried over into funding for the federal agency tasked with improving elections. As the House and Senate work to resolve differences in their respective appropriations bills, Congress must find the will to fund the U.S. Election Assistance Commission at the level required to carry out its vital mission.

Congress created the EAC to serve as a national clearinghouse of information on election administration, test and certify voting equipment, conduct studies on elections in America, and administer grant funding to states. To fulfill these roles, the EAC requires staff, contractors, and an operating budget to bring policymakers, administrators, and experts together to improve election administration across the country.

The EAC received just $7.95 million in FY2019 for general operating support, which represents the lowest amount the Commission has received since its creation in 2004. The budget was 69% larger at the high-water mark for its operating funds in 2010. The threats to elections have grown in number and the complexity has exploded, but the EAC has not kept up.

Line chart of EAC appropriations from FY2005 until FY2019

Table of EAC appropriations from FY2005 until FY2019 in total and for operating expenses

A rough calculation of regular EAC expenses shows quite how quickly $7.95 million goes. The EAC must fund its Office of Inspector General ($1 million); the Election Administration and Voting Survey ($900,000); and the salaries and benefits of the six statutory employees, including four commissioners, executive director, and general counsel ($1.2 million). The remaining $5 million has to cover rent for office space, the disbursement and monitoring of federal election security grants, the voting system testing and certification program, the meetings of the EAC Board of Advisors, EAC Standards Board, and Technical Guidelines Development Committee as well as all other staff salaries. It’s not enough to do the job.

The Senate and House of Representatives are far apart on the appropriate level of funding for the EAC. The House-passed appropriations bill would provide the agency about $12.5 million in operating funds for 2020. The companion appropriations bill in the Senate would only provide about $8.1 million. Congress must get to the higher end of that range.

I concede that EAC has done itself no favors. The commission has been embroiled in litigation on different fronts and has been unable to update voting system guidelines in a substantial way since 2007. And it will likely enter 2020 without an executive director or general counsel, two positions that become vacant this week after the incumbents’ four-year terms expire.  The EAC’s clearinghouse function, which could add so much value to the field, has not yet performed as expected.

Yet, Congress has exacerbated the problems. Long vacancies on the commission have left the agency without a quorum for more than a quarter of its existence, including a nearly 10-year vacancy in one of the commissioner roles, and less than a third of the time have all four commissioner seats been filled. The level of funding over the past seven years makes it difficult to recruit and retain staff, who know they will be asked to serve in many different capacities.

A functioning and funded EAC would be a real value add for election officials:

• The turnover in local election administration is high. The EAC’s clearinghouse would supplement the efforts states make to train new election administrators quickly at a cost saving to the states.

• The EAC has a unique ability to view the entire election landscape across the country. The commissioners and staff should be sharing lessons learned from policy development and implementation in one state with policymakers and administrators in all the other states to improve the voting experience. The commission can also be a better resource for officials in the administration and Congress on the development of federal election policy.

• Election security is currently key priority of the Department of Homeland Security, which designated elections as critical infrastructure in 2017. Unlike other critical infrastructure designations, the elections designation was made at the secretary level and not in law. While DHS may be making efforts in 2019 and 2020 to connect federal resources to state and local administrators, future DHS secretaries with other priorities may do the same. The EAC is the only federal agency whose mission is to support election administration across the country.

• EAC’s data collection and analysis program helps administrators and policymakers understand the electorate in context. Additional focus on research that helps everyone understand U.S. election administration would lead to better policy development.

• Voting systems must be tested against rigorous standards. The manufacturers are ready to build state-of-the art voting systems once they have a clear understanding of federal standards coming from the EAC.

The EAC needs one more chance to prove its value to the field. It has a full complement of commissioners and national attention. Congress must provide the appropriate level of funding that allows the commission to perform its duties well.

Priorities for Congress in Appropriating Election Security Funding

This post was originally on the BPC blog

Any entity—individual, nonprofit, company, or government—that has Internet-connected processes must focus on cybersecurity. That is just the current reality. For too long, election administration has only been a focus when something goes spectacularly wrong, like chads not fully detaching from punch cards or non-recountable elections. Those that would disrupt elections today can do so from thousands of miles away and that threat has not diminished. In fact, it is always evolving and reinventing itself. To protect democracy requires a sustained effort by state and local officials with the financial support of the federal government.

Congress will be considering this fall additional grants to states to secure the voting process from outside interference. The needs from local election administrators on the front lines and state election officials are many, and Congress can do much to target future appropriations for maximum impact.

While a full public discussion of each policy consideration would help the public to more fully understand Congressional priorities, the main attention during the upcoming appropriations cycle should center on four main conversations:

1. How to prioritize the replacement of outdated technology with voting systems using robust and auditable paper ballots

2. Ways to get money to local election administrators

3. The appropriate balance between federal and state funding

4. Defining what success is

First, federal policy should support paper-based voting systems with robust and auditable paper trails and require rigorous pre- and post-election auditing of various aspects of the elections process. There is a provision in the House-passed fiscal year 2020 financial services appropriation bill, HR3351, that requires states to certify they are only using paper-based voting systems before federal grant money can be spent on other security upgrades. We believe that paper-based systems that allow for some sort of ballot marking device for voters with disabilities are the best option on the market today. BPC further encourages states to prioritize the replacement of older voting systems that do not produce auditable records.

However, restrictions like this one that prioritize the move to paper-based systems over all other security enhancements is an overly prescriptive requirement at this time that will have unintended consequences on the usefulness of federal election security grants ahead of 2020. In this case, it means that states would not be able to access grants to secure voter registration databases and hire additional IT staff, which are likely to have more immediate impacts on repelling foreign interference.

Second, Congress should ensure that federal funding is getting to the front-line election administrators. The equipment, policies, and processes that voters interact with when casting a ballot are administered locally. In too many states, election officials at the local level report that they have received none of their state’s share of the $380 million sent in 2018. This needs to change.

Congress can require that a percentage of the funding be passed through from states to local jurisdictions. However, the federal funding should not go directly to local jurisdictions. It is hard to conceive of an effective program that requires the U.S. Election Assistance Commission, which administers federal election security grants, to work with thousands of local election jurisdictions. Some of those jurisdictions are incredibly small and would have a difficult time complying with the numerous requirements that come with federal dollars.

Local officials could use the money to address vulnerabilities such as:

• IT and cybersecurity limitations

• Physical security of election equipment

• Auditing the elections process

• Hiring security-focused staff

While effective investments have been made federally and at the state-level over the past two years, it is time to create a structure that increases the chance that the front-line election administrators have what they need to run a secure election.

Third, any discussion of additional federal funding for elections should include a look at the states’ share of the investment. Election improvement grants to date have come with a mandatory 5% match by the states, and it is not unreasonable to consider an increase in the match from states to access the federal funds. State and local policymakers are usually eager to access federal funds to improve election security and are seeking larger appropriations and a more reliable long-term semi-regular funding mechanism. They need to step up as well. Moreover, states should not expect continued federal resources to cover all necessary capital upgrades. These cannot be the sole responsibility of the federal government.

Finally, policymakers from both parties and at all levels of government must together define what “success” means for federal election security grants. Too many have argued that a lack of overt interference in 2018 represents success that means further federal involvement is unnecessary.

Congress agrees that there was interference in the elections process in 2016. The recent Senate Intelligence Committee report about the efforts of foreign governments to infiltrate the election administration process is among the most in-depth and bipartisan examinations of the 2016 election. The federal government’s designation of elections as critical infrastructure in January 2017 and the work by the Department of Homeland Security since are relatively unknown success stories for how the federal government can work with states and localities on policy. Yet none of these successes means that the work is done or that the federal government’s role is diminished going forward.

In the context of election security grants, success could be shown through

• The number of jurisdictions brought up to a baseline IT infrastructure, participating in cybersecurity trainings, and implementing cybersecurity best practices.

• The number jurisdictions using the money to purchase and roll out voting systems with auditable paper and performing audits.

• A new metric on intergovernmental coordination to secure elections that builds a bipartisan, united front about the fundamental need to protect our democratic ideals from outside influence.

Congress can come together this fall to take a step forward in securing our elections. It means stepping away from some well-worn talking points and working in the areas where common ground can be achieved. This fall’s process to fund the federal government may one day be looked at as the beginning of a coherent national strategy on elections. I hope it is.

Congress Should Secure Elections for the Long-Term

This post was originally on the BPC blog.

Congress still has time to address multiple weaknesses in how we secure our elections before 2020 and for the long-term. It requires rising above thorny partisan disputes and agreeing to a set of shared values and goals for the election process. It also means settling on at least a minimal role the federal government can play in elections.  This may seem a tall order in today’s political environment, but I have reason to think there is a window for success during the funding battles to come this fall.

A unified Republican Congress in early 2018 appropriated $380 million to secure the voting process representing the largest appropriation of federal funding to states for elections since the initial outlays under the Help America Vote Act in 2002. Those federal resources were rushed to states to combat rising cybersecurity concerns that emerged from the 2016 presidential election. Congress aimed to make a positive impact on the 2018 cycle.

The 2018 cycle did not generate the worrisome headlines we saw in 2016, but that may not be directly attributable to the 2018 congressional appropriation. In fact, much of that money was not spent before Americans cast their ballots during the midterms last year. It is projected that states will still have a small percentage of the 2018 grants remaining after the 2020 election, and all the money must be spent by early 2023.

Despite some remaining funds from a significant one-time investment, states will need much more funding with reliability over the long-term in addition to a robust partnership with their federal and local partners to secure our elections processes in the ways American expect.

Where Do Federal Resources Make the Biggest Impact?

Congress determines the acceptable uses for federal election funding. These expenditures should reflect a bipartisan understanding of the most basic role of the federal government in elections: election security.

And that is where states have spent the money so far. In the U.S. Election Assistance Commission’s annual report to Congress about the spending of election grants to states, states reported plans to spend the funding to replace outdated voting technology, to conduct external security analyses, to upgrade voter registration databases, and to harden physical security among many other strategies.

The level of funding in most cases allows states to begin making these needed investments, but the vulnerabilities and needs are far greater than existing funding allows and will require regular expenditures over several funding cycles. Any technology purchased in part with federal funding will require frequent upgrading of software and hardware on more reasonable timelines than election officials have made them in the past.

Federal funding incentivizes states to make investments in their elections processes. The money Congress sent to states must be matched at 5% with state funds, which is a small way of ensuring the states have “skin in the game.” The availability of federal funding also adds political pressure on states for policymakers to focus resources on their elections systems; no policymaker wants to leave federal funding on the table when it comes to securing democracy. That’s good for each state’s voters because they will be participating in a more secure election process, but it also improves overall confidence in the U.S. voting process because voters know that election security is a priority everywhere.

Still, specific voter-facing election policy is best made at the state and local level where legislators can select policies that reflect historical decisions, current electorate preferences, and the interaction between new laws with other intertwined parts of the process.

The federal role revolves around election policy is—at minimum—one that focuses on the legitimacy and security of the voting process. With American elections under attack from foreign adversaries, states cannot all successfully defend themselves without the full backing of the United States government. They need the robust partnership to avoid further activities that only serve to delegitimize our elections.

That is why states need to continue spending existing and future federal grants on those investments most immediately focused on securing the elections process and most in line with Congressional intent. States should:

• Upgrade the hardware and security of state voter registration databases, which serve as the basis of many other election administration functions.

• Secure voting systems that include durable paper ballots that are counted on separate machines than those used to mark the ballot.

• Revamp the basic IT infrastructure of elections offices. The largest election jurisdictions have significant IT teams. The smallest offices have no IT staff and are often included on the county’s servers with no firewalls. Any attacks affecting the county could take the election office offline.

• Move all jurisdictions to “.gov” websites and email servers, which would ensure voters know that they are interacting with the trusted sources of information.

• Schedule the whole suite of cybersecurity training for all election administrators at every level and implement multifactor authentication at least to the most vulnerable databases.

• Develop a program of cyber navigators that seeks to connect election officials with appropriate resources would be highly effective and in need of further expansion and elevate an individual in state election offices with the role of keeping all jurisdictions in the state aware of cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities.

There are many other areas where Congress could improve the voting experience for all Americans. Admittedly there are a larger number of ideological differences in those areas. But Congress cannot let a lack of consensus on other areas of election policy derail their responsibility today to assist states and local officials to secure American democracy.

C-SPAN Washington Journal Appearance

On September 3, I was the featured guest on C-SPAN’s morning show, Washington Journal.

On Election Security, More Transparency Can Rebuild Voters’ Trust

Congress has finally held an all-members election security briefing by top Department of Homeland Security and federal law enforcement officials to learn about progress made since 2016 and threats to future elections. It was a valuable, if overly-delayed, first step for Congress to fully understand the vulnerabilities our democracy faces. But why was it all done in secret?

Elections are the foundation of American democracy, and they must be free, fair, secure, and accessible, for all eligible voters. They must also be as transparent as possible so that voters have confidence in the legitimacy of the process that the government has designed to elect the people’s representatives to that government.

Congress missed a rare opportunity to improve public confidence in election security.

There will always be a balance to strike between security and transparency when it comes to elections. Voters want to know that the system is free and fair, and election administrators will never share information about the process that could lead to exploitation by foreign actors. So how do we get to a secure and fair election?

Voter registration is one example of the balance between the security and transparency priorities. To secure the voting process, eligible citizens in all states—except North Dakota—must be registered to vote in order to receive and cast a ballot. Registering voters allows election officials to verify an individual’s eligibility, ensuring that each voter meets constitutional and state legal requirements to vote and only receives one ballot. For transparency, states then make the voter rolls—and in many cases the database of election history—accessible to the public. That way the public knows who is eligible to vote and for which races they can and did cast a ballot.

It is no different when it comes to the balance policymakers must strike to defend the election process from outside intrusion. No one expects states and counties to defend themselves alone against foreign attacks in any other context. A military attack on any one state by a foreign adversary would elicit a response from the United States military, not that one state’s National Guard. It should be no different for attacks on any state’s electoral process, which local and state election administrators have long had to defend by themselves.

The federal government has now identified a role for itself in securing American elections. First, DHS designated the elections process as critical infrastructure after the 2016 election. Then the states received a total of $380 million in federal grants in early 2018 for election security. It was the first substantial appropriation of new funding for election administration since the Help America Vote Act passed in 2002, although much of the money was disbursed to states too late to be spent before the 2018 election.

Because the federal government has a role in protection our elections process, the American public has a right, within reason, to know what it is doing. Unfortunately, the public rarely hears about the improvements made using federal grants, or where more funding is needed to ensure a free and fair process. No one is asking the government to divulge state secrets related to our defense posture. But the public has reasonable questions about election integrity and whether states are being responsible and efficient with the federal funds.

The facts are these: elections are more secure than ever, the federal funding has helped but much more is needed, and the public is mostly unaware of both the great progress made and remaining vulnerabilities.

Government at all levels must act quickly to rebuild Americans’ trust in the system, which has been shaken by recent events. Without action, we leave open a door for candidates of any political party to irresponsibly cast doubt on election results and further erode confidence in one of the central tenets of our democracy: the idea that our votes count.

Confidence in the legitimacy of the process requires a public discussion about the priorities we have for the election system, from accessibility to security, and how to best balance them. Congress is well-positioned to lead such a discussion. Instead, the House and Senate heard about election security behind closed doors. It was an unforced error when Congress could have easily included a public component to last week’s security briefing.

Improve Elections, Fully Confirm Election Assistance Commission Before 2020

It’s hard to make progress when you have both hands tied behind your back a third of the time. Voters want more secure and better functioning elections, and Congress can act right now to accomplish that. In the swirl of election security concerns, ballot design problems, and vote counting confusion, the Senate should take up the two pending nominees to the United States Election Assistance Commission (EAC) before adjourning this month.

The EAC is the federal government’s main arm for disseminating election administration information to state and local election officials. The Commission sets the guidelines for voting systems and certifies the machines that voters use to cast ballots. Commission staff collect and disseminate vital data about election administration, share best practices, facilitate outreach to language minority voters and those with disabilities, and much more.

Since the first four commissioners were confirmed on December 9, 2003, however, the EAC has only had a quorum (three commissioners) to take action 68 percent of the time. In fact, there has been a full complement of four commissioners for just 28 percent of the commission’s existence.

These somewhat rosy numbers belie the fact that the good old days of relatively consistent quorums ended back in 2011. Since the start of 2012?a period which includes attempts by foreign adversaries to infiltrate elections, the deterioration of machines purchased back in 2004, and rising distrust in the conduct of elections?the commission has had a quorum just 47 percent of the time. One of the Democratic seats on the Commission has been vacant for 3,566 days. It doesn’t have to be this way.

Why do we need a quorum at the EAC? A fully functioning Commission would likely move new voting systems guidelines soon after being reconstituted. These guidelines have not received substantial revisions since 2005. The Commission has been hard at work at a revamped set of guidelines since it regained a quorum in 2014. Those revisions are nearly complete but require commissioners to vote on implementation. Additionally, a quorum would allow the Commission to more effectively lead on election security, voter registration modernization, and expanding access to voting while preserving the integrity of the system.

The Bipartisan Policy Center works on policies that lead to a secure and modern voter registration system, an accessible and fair casting of ballots, and an accurate counting of the vote.

There are two commissioners currently serving at the EAC. Both Chair Thomas Hicks and Vice Chair Christy McCormick were confirmed in 2014. Each is serving on an expired term, which has not been unusual for the EAC over the past 15 years. Both can serve until another nominee is confirmed for their slots.

The Senate Rules and Administration Committee heard from the nominees last week. If the full Senate does not vote to confirm these nominees before adjourning, the process must begin from scratch. That would be an unforced error in the process to improve the voting experience just as we begin preparation for the 2020 election cycle.

Why We Need the Election Assistance Commission

FIRST APPEARED ON THE BPC BLOG ON FEBRUARY 9, 2017

On Tuesday, the House Administration Committee considered a bill to eliminate the only federal agency tasked with improving the voting process for all Americans. If this seems like a strange response to an election marked by allegations of voter fraud, voter suppression, and election rigging—from both sides of the political aisle—you’re not wrong.

While there are legitimate concerns about the role of the federal government in elections, eliminating the United States Election Assistance Commission will lead to less secure and more costly elections in the future. And all Americans will lose.

Regularly over the last decade, lawmakers have argued that the EAC intrudes on state and local election administrators who bear the responsibility for actually running American elections, and that it costs too much for the services it provides. But there are real and vital reasons for the EAC to exist.

“Eliminating the United States Election Assistance Commission will lead to less secure and more costly elections in the future. And all Americans will lose.”

The EAC was created in 2002 as part of the Help America Vote Act, which itself was a response to real failures of election administration in the 2000 election. The goal was never to centralize election administration within the federal government, but rather to provide support to state and local administrators on the front lines of the voting experience. Notably, even after one of the closest elections in history, the bill passed with nearly unanimous bipartisan support.

From its creation, the EAC has never had more than 60 employees (including myself from 2008 to 2011), and it currently has half as many. But this small agency was given responsibility for “Motor Voter,” collecting data from states, and—for the first time ever—testing and certifying voting systems to standards. With rigorous research, strong fact-based data, and a comprehensive perspective on voting practices across the country, this agency moves the needle forward on essential improvements that states often resist without a little push.

Here is how Americans lose without an EAC.

First, the backbone of voter registration in this country is the National Voter Registration Act, or the “Motor Voter” law. Before this federal foray into voter registration, states had carte blanche to determine where, when, and how voters could register. This law required a simple registration form to be proactively provided at state departments of motor vehicles and other social service agencies. Instead of passive registration, states were for the first time required to do much more to promote voting to their citizens. The EAC tracks and reports on states’ compliance with these rules.

This new bill would transfer Motor Voter responsibilities back to the Federal Election Commission, which administered these statutes before the EAC existed. The FEC’s mission, despite its broad-sounding name, is narrow: it enforces the Federal Election Campaign Act, regulating money in politics. Many, myself included, believe the FEC has little interest or expertise in voter registration issues, which are outside its core mission. Registration issues represent some of the tallest barriers to voter participation. These issues are too vital to be treated as an agency’s side project.

Second, the EAC collects unique data from every election jurisdiction in this country. The biennial Election Administration and Voting Survey has become the gold standard for researchers and policymakers looking to make sense of election administration across the country and to offer recommendations about how to improve voters’ experience at the polls. The EAC’s data about absentee voting, provisional voting, early voting, and so much more leads to evidence-based policymaking that furthers the goal of efficient, accurate, and professional elections. The legislation before Congress eliminates this data collection and reporting function. Because, no private organization has the capacity to replicate this work, election officials nationwide will once again be flying blind when it comes to how their colleagues operate and ways that they can improve their own systems.

A key function of the EAC is the testing and certification of voting systems to ensure each state’s chosen voting technology will in fact work on election day. Before the EAC, the testing and so-called certification of voting systems was done by a non-governmental organization. While doing yeoman’s work, the teams responsible for this task were underqualified and overwhelmed. Voting standards were out of date and sorely lacking.

The voting system market does not work perfectly today. However, the EAC administers reasonable and consistent voluntary voting system guidelines and is currently two years into a four-year process to dramatically improve those guidelines so that they reflect the needs of voters today. Without national guidelines, which by their very title are voluntary for the states, voting system manufacturers can produce whatever technology makes them the most money. Individual states, acting without a national voting systems certification process, may try to impose their own unique standards on manufacturers. Without getting into whether these state standards would be as rigorous as those the EAC creates, it will drive up costs for voting technology if voting system manufacturers have to build to more than 50 state certification programs. Voters will cover this cost in one way or another.

The EAC’s budget is about $8 million annually. That means that this agency costs each participating voter in 2016 about 6 cents. The EAC ensures the integrity of our elections while performing bipartisan research about innovations for elections in the future. It is every voter’s advocate when it comes to voter registration. And without the EAC, the voting technology market of the future will be an unworkable mess. It is every Americans’ interest to see that the lights are kept on at the EAC.